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One of E. H. Carr’s most quoted comments from The Twenty Years’ Crisis is the 
distinction between the utopian and realist phases in the development of a science. 
The utopian phase is marked by the dominance of aspirations over a hard-nosed 
understanding of the world, and is a sign of immaturity. A gloss on Carr’s 
interpretation of science might argue that the mark of a mature science is when it 
stops thinking in absolutes and regards each issue as complex. This is certainly true of 
Carr’s own subject of history, where simplistic Whig histories – to use Herbert 
Butterfield’s phrase – have given way to complex multi-layered readings of the past. 
Unfortunately, in International Relations (IR) the historical analysis of our own 
disciplinary history is riddled with over-simplifications and a Whig history that 
interprets the past only in terms of the present. In a world where current foreign policy 
initiatives are frequently justified by the drawing of analogies with events in the 
recent past, IR’s incapacity to understand its own history and past role in world affairs 
is particularly unfortunate. 
 What I intend to do here is to concentrate on one oversimplification in IR’s 
auto-history, that is the idea that we can talk about an idealist school in IR prior to the 
Second World War. It is this oversimplification that has crippled attempts to 
understand the place of IR scholarship in the policy debates of the inter-war period. 
Several authors have already dealt with the issue of the non-existence of a realist-
idealist debate (Wilson, 1998; Ashworth, 1999; Ashworth 2002). The purpose of this 
article is to demonstrate that the concept of idealism not only does not accurately 
reflect IR’s past, it also does an extreme disservice to those who are written off as 
idealists. The list of idealist traits that often appear in introductory IR textbooks, more 
often than not, bear no relationship to the actual ideas professed by those who have 
been labelled as idealist. While this is also, to a certain extent, true of those who have 
been labelled as realists (E. H. Carr and Martin Wight, for example, often fit rather 
poorly with the list of realist attributes found in introductory texts), the problem with 
the label idealist is worse. Idealism as a concept in IR is inaccurate, confusing and is 
often used to describe such a diverse group of people as to be intellectually worthless. 
The fact that it is still employed by so many writers in IR reveals an intellectual 
laziness of staggering proportions. 
 I have two major problems with the term idealism in IR. The first is that the 
presentation of the concept of idealism does not accurately describe the writers who 
have been called idealist. The second is that the term obscures major theoretical and 
policy debates between the vast number of writers written off as idealist, while also 
overplaying the differences between the supposed realists and idealists. There is also a 
minor problem that idealism, as used in IR, gets confused with the more specific use 
of the term in political theory. The problem here is that the vast majority of writers 
that have been written off as idealist in IR are, from a political theory point of view, 
materialists rather than idealists. A related confusion here is that a number of those 
called realists, such as E. H. Carr, have philosophical idealist moments. The Hans 
Morgenthau of Scientific Man v. Power Politics is also strongly philosophically 
idealist, at least in the first two-thirds of the book. The term idealism would, in fact, 
be better employed in describing those writers, many of them realists, who have 
criticised materialism and scientism in IR. In this sense, the ‘second great debate’ of 
the 1960s between behaviouralists and traditionalists might be better described as a 
materialist-idealist debate. 
 
 
 
 
  
  
4 
A definition of idealism? 
 Any attempt to refute the charge of idealism in IR is immediately hampered by 
a lack of consensus about what idealism means. This is not helped by the frequent 
substitution of the term utopianism – Carr’s preferred term – for idealism. Generally, 
the terms are used interchangeably both then and now, even though the two terms can 
carry subtly different meanings. Peter Wilson, in his analysis of the international 
theory of Leonard Woolf dedicated a whole chapter to the question of ‘what is 
idealism?’ before he was able to refute the use of the label to describe Woolf’s work 
(Woolf, 2003: ch. 2). A further layer of confusion is added by the loose use of the 
terms idealism and realism in the inter-war literature itself, although it has to be 
pointed out that until the later 1930s realism and idealism were not very common 
labels to apply to IR scholars and their work, except when hurled as very anti-
intellectual insults. Interestingly, Ramsay MacDonald, in his review of the socialist 
movement in 1911, uses ‘idealist’ and ‘utopian’ to describe political views that are 
positive and progressive (Ramsay MacDonald, 1911: ix). A similar interpretation of 
idealism was later to be taken up by Woodrow Wilson, when he frequently praised 
United States foreign policy as idealist. The implication here is that to be idealist is to 
think in terms of achievable goals for the common good. In both cases idealism is 
used as a broad description, rather than as a paradigm. These positive connotations, 
however, were largely overshadowed by their use as terms of disparagement. In this 
sense idealism and utopianism became useful rhetorical devices for opponents of 
change in international affairs. In 1917 Leonard Woolf complained that the charge of 
Utopian was used by the opponents of any reform in order to discredit change: 
‘Everything is Utopian until it is tried’ was his response to these charges (Woolf, 
1917: 57-8). 
The terms idealism and realism in the inter-war period were often used in 
contradictory and inconsistent ways. Sometimes they would be used to describe 
specific modes of thought, and at other times to describe particular groups. For 
example, in 1923 Brailsford used realist and liberal idealist to describe two groups of 
supporters of the First World War. Brailsford’s intent was to refute both the 
supporters of the old diplomacy (realists) and the liberals who saw the war as an 
opportunity to establish a new order (idealists), and subsequently to argue his own 
socialist criticism of the post-war order. By contrast, in 1924 Brailsford used the terms 
realist and idealist to describe two methods of thought that were necessary for good 
policy-making: ‘To see the world as realists, and yet to keep the driving force of our 
own ideal – that is the test for Labour come to power’ (1923: 4; 1924: 9). He returned 
to this theme of compatible modes of thought in 1928 (1928: ch. XIV). Eight years 
earlier, in his condemnation of the Treaty of Versailles, Brailsford complained that it 
‘is not the unbending logic of the idealist which has made this sweeping settlement. 
Fear and ambition… have wrought these catastrophic changes’ (1920: 32). Here 
idealists are interpreted as a specific group that had no influence on the construction 
of the 1919 peace. In 1924 Alfred Zimmern, returning to MacDonald’s positive 
definition of 1911, wrote approvingly of the ‘fundamental idealism’ of the British 
people (1924: 3-4), while a month earlier J. A. Hobson saw hope for international 
cooperation in the revival of idealism in the United States (1923: 3). A similar use of 
idealism to denote progressive ideals was applied to Russian policy in the Balkans by 
C. Delisle Burns (1924: 9), while Helen Swanwick wrote of the failure of those who 
cling to the old pre-Great War fallacies of the militaristic international anarchy, and 
call themselves realists (1924: 171). Idealism is given a more neutral, and descriptive 
definition by David Mitrany in 1925, when he refers to German supporters of a Pan-
Europa plan as a ‘more idealistic group’ (1925a: 3). 
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Generally, though, the 1920s saw little use of the term idealist and realist, and 
when they were used it was primarily as adjectives to describe particular policies, and 
certainly not as paradigms. In Hugh Dalton’s influential 1928 book Towards the 
Peace of Nations, which had a strong influence on the policy of the Second Labour 
Government, the terms realist and idealist are never used, mainly because they had 
little to add to the many debates over the form and structure of the contemporary 
international security architecture. For the most part, those who were later derided as 
idealists spent too much of their time writing nuts and bolts studies on specific 
questions to dwell on abstract labelling. David Mitrany wrote on international 
sanctions (1925b), Philip Noel Baker on disarmament and the Geneva Protocol (1926; 
1925), William Arnold Forster on arbitration (1927) and, in the United States, James 
T. Shotwell studied the Kellogg-Briand Pact (1929). The major exception to this 
comes from the right of the political spectrum, where realism and idealism were used 
as labels for separate modes of thought. The most famous example of this from the 
1920s is F. E. Smith’s often-quoted rectorial address given at Glasgow University in 
November 1923. Smith was a major figure in the Conservative Party, and he used this 
opportunity to denounce what he saw as a flawed intellectual attitude in British 
foreign policy circles. Smith defined idealism in three ways: it was ‘the spirit which 
impels an individual or group of individuals to a loftier standard of conduct’; the 
philosophical view that ‘in external conceptions the objects immediately known are 
ideas’; and the antithesis of the ‘school of self interest’ (Smith, 1960: 207-8). The first 
two are specific and generally neutral descriptions, but the third is a dangerous creed 
that is undermining British foreign policy. This idealist school – no members are 
specified – is contrasted with a realist school that accepts the primacy of self-interest 
as the driving force of human relations. Realism, for Smith, was firmly based on an 
understanding of a fixed and knowable human nature (1960: 208-10. Interestingly, 
though, Smith sees the period before the First World War, when British public figures 
were too willing to accept German assurances of peaceful intent, as the period in 
which ‘Idealism became rampant with those in power’ (1960: 213). Smith brings his 
analysis to a conclusion with a defence of what he sees as the ultimate British realist 
policy: ‘the road of our Imperial destiny’ (1960: 216). This comes closest to the 
conceptions of realist and idealist found in current IR texts, but it must be pointed out 
that no liberal or socialist writer accepted Smith’s categories. 
After 1931, in response to the rise of fascism and the seeming inactivity of the 
western democracies, realism and idealism began to reappear as terms of abuse. In 
1933, in the light of the weakening of the League and the rise of fascism, the socialist 
H. N. Brailsford associated the dichotomy between idealism and realism with the 
question of the value of League collective security: ‘To spend further time in 
elaborating the League’s charter of paper safeguards against war would be to show a 
lack of realism’, and later in the same piece: ‘We have tasks more urgent than the 
mapping of Utopia’ (1933: 285-6) A year later Gilbert Murray, in his presidential 
address to the 1934 International Studies Conferences in Paris went out of his way to 
condemn what he called realist ideas of a static power-hungry human nature and the 
primacy of national interest. Interestingly, these ideas that Murray attacked were 
being advocated at the conference by a representative from Fascist Italy (Bourquin, 
1936: 458-9). In the late 1930’s realism came to mean those who advocated a return 
to pre-1914 norms of diplomacy (despite F. E. Smith’s 1923 opinion on that period’s 
idealist credentials), and idealist came to be used as a pejorative for those who 
supported the League collective security system. An exception is E. H. Carr’s analysis 
of the Treaty of Versailles, originally written in 1937, which refers, despite 
Brailsford’s 1920 claim to the contrary, to ‘a substructure of genuine idealism’ in the 
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League system, that created institutions that were ‘a regular and essential part of the 
new world order.’ Idealism, for Carr, was seen as unhappily blended with ‘the 
exigencies of the victorious Powers’ in the other parts of the Treaty (Carr, 1948: 5). 
Here, the implication is that idealism was a positive influence, even if its mix with the 
realpolitik of the Allies was an unhappy one. By contrast, in 1938 Salvador de 
Madariaga saw realism as an atavistic and non-intellectual attempt to return to the pre-
1914 diplomacy, and a failure to realise that international relations had changed since 
the war. Looking back to the Munich agreement of 1938, A. L. Rowse in 1940 
criticised the Chamberlain government for claiming that its disastrous appeasement 
policy was ‘realism’, and collective security against Hitler was ‘midsummer madness’ 
(1947: 69). These later 1930’s attitudes are summed up by Michael Foot in 1944, 
where realism is the intellectual tool of the right. The intent of the right, in which 
group Foot includes Carr, is to refute the supporters of collective security on the left, 
while advocating a return to the discredited pre-1914 diplomacy. This, for Foot, is a 
strategy that can only lead to fresh conflicts and future slaughters (1944: 13-4). In the 
same year Leonard Woolf denounced the ‘“realist” statesmen and Tory nationalists… 
[who] are living in a world which had already disappeared with the stage-coach and 
tallow candle’ (1944: 6). What is interesting about the 1930s is that the term realism is 
more frequently used than idealism, and when idealism is used it is almost always a 
term of abuse levelled either by conservatives at the liberals and socialists, or by some 
socialists at pacifists and (increasingly) supporters of the League. 
 Thus, the inter-war definitions involve three not completely unrelated 
definitions of idealism. It is the intellectual yoke-mate to realism that allows us to 
progress; it is a refutation of the belief in a static aggressive human nature and the 
primacy of the national interest; and it is a description, by their enemies, of the 
supporters of collective security through the League, who oppose a return to pre-1914 
diplomatic practices. E. H. Carr’s use of the term utopianism takes aspects of these 
three interpretations of idealism, although he reverses the association of realism with 
the right/reactionary and idealism/utopianism with the left/progressive. What is 
important to note, however, is that the terms realist and idealist are used infrequently 
prior to 1939, and when they are they are employed as loose descriptions, rather than 
hard and fast scientific terms. Certainly in Britain it was far more common to use the 
more familiar terms conservative, liberal and socialist if your intention was an 
intellectual description, rather than just plain abuse. Brailsford, for example, preferred 
to refer to his tradition of thought as socialist (1935: 18, 37, 40-1). To inter-war 
writers these were clear and distinct paradigms that were applicable to the domestic 
and the international realms equally. Conservatism tended to be linked, especially by 
its enemies, to the old pre-war diplomacy that had caused the war; liberalism was 
linked to both free trade and the development of international institutions; while 
socialism supported liberal aspirations of transcending the old diplomacy, but 
believed that questions of economic imperialism and control had to be dealt with 
before an equitable order was possible. These tended to exist independently of the 
pacifist tradition, and the presence of pacifists in all three political paradigms created 
a second, paradigm-crossing, cleavage within IR. When used merely to describe two 
necessary modes of thought realism and idealism became separate attributes of all 
three political ideologies, although idealism as a positive progressive attitude was 
frequently seen as a defining attribute of liberalism and socialism, albeit tempered by 
an equal, and necessary, dose of realism. When describing particular groups, realism 
was most frequently used to describe the conservatives; idealism was often attached to 
the liberal; while socialist writers, like Brailsford, liked to see themselves as a 
balanced mixture of both realism and idealism. Just to confuse things, idealism and 
  
  
7 
utopianism as insults were also used to describe the disparate pacifist traditions. In his 
1937 evaluation of the Labour Party, for example, the historian A. L. Rowse refers to 
the pacifist wing of the Party as ‘unrealists’ (1947: 112). 
Part of the reason why Carr’s work created so much debate at the time of its 
publication was the novelty of his labels. Dropping the tripartite conservative-liberal-
socialist categories, his notions of realism and utopianism consciously crossed 
ideological divides. His definitions of realism and utopianism, however, were based 
on previous uses of the terms. Carr, following the earlier definition of realism and 
idealism as modes of thought, presents realism and utopianism as two necessary 
elements in IR. Utopianism provides the positive side to the dialectic, while realism 
provides the negative. In The Twenty Years’ Crisis Carr sees the need for both modes 
of thought, but is deeply critical of the current manifestation of utopianism. Carr’s 
criticism of the utopians in inter-war IR follows much of the same pattern as the 
criticism that the ‘realist’ right directed towards the supporters of the League. In this 
part of his argument he reverts to using the terms as descriptions of actual writers. 
Despite his Marxist credentials, Carr’s criticism of the Utopians follows the same 
ground as the conservative supporters of the old diplomacy, although many socialists 
are included in the realist camp, while virtually no liberal is. Not surprisingly, The 
Twenty Years’ Crisis favoured the Chamberlain Government’s policy of appeasement, 
especially the recent Munich Agreement (Carr, 1939: 278, 282). In later works, in 
which Carr does provide visions of the way the world should work, he clearly favours 
the ‘mode of thought’ interpretation of realism and utopianism. In Nationalism and 
After, for example, he proposes a functional system of international government that 
he sees as a good combination of the recognition of realist power realities and utopian 
goals (Carr, 1945: 47-74). In short, the inter-war writers, including E. H. Carr, do not 
really give us a clear idea of whether idealism is a mode of thought – a tool open to 
any thinker or group of thinkers – or a way of defining a particular group of thinkers. 
Prior to Carr most writers on international affairs in Britain preferred to define 
themselves using the more common ideological epithets. 
 
The post-hoc development of an idealist paradigm 
 Despite these confusions, the terms realist and idealist came to define the 
inter-war period for future IR scholars. This led to a series of definitions of realism 
and idealism by the authors of textbooks and reviews of the discipline. Summaries of 
these various definitions of idealism can be found in a number of recent publications 
(Ashworth, 1999: ch. 5; Wilson, 2003: ch.2). The major difference is between those 
writers, particularly in 1950’s America, who saw realism and idealism as two parts of 
the predominant realist paradigm; and those, particularly textbooks, that saw idealism 
as a separate paradigm with its own specific writers. The first group includes John 
Herz’s 1951 book, Herbert Butterfield’s 1951 article, Arnold Wolfers’ short 1969 
piece and, more recently, Martin Griffiths’ 1992 book (Herz, 1951; Butterfield, 1951; 
Wolfers, 1969; Griffiths, 1992). All four stress idealism and realism as natural 
tensions within a broader realist-dominated paradigm. For Herz idealism is linked to 
the use of rationalist solutions to solve problems, while Butterfield contrasts the 
scientific and moralistic approaches to international affairs. Arnold Wolfers’ concern 
was to create a synthesis between realism, which concentrates on the quest for power, 
and an idealism that seeks to eliminate power relations through the promotion of 
universal principles. Martin Griffiths, by contrast, interprets the approaches of 
Morgenthau and Waltz as idealist, and compares them to the realism of the English 
school. A different take on this approach can be found within the British Labour Party 
after the Second World War. The influential Socialist Union pamphlet of 1953, 
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Socialism and Foreign Policy, which includes a foreword by Philip Noel Baker, uses 
realism and idealism as two elements in the evolution of Labour attitudes to the world. 
The idealism is the essential socialist underpinnings, which were made workable by 
Labour’s acceptance of the realism of power relations from 1914 onwards. Rather 
than competing poles, realism and idealism become necessary parts of a successful 
progressive foreign policy (Socialist Union, 1953). 
 By contrast, the other set of modern writers regard idealism as a fully-fledged, 
albeit largely defunct, paradigm with recognisably non-realist proponents. Despite 
coming late to IR, Hedley Bull’s analysis is the one writer in this group that is closest 
to an accurate view of inter-war IR. For him idealism was marked by ‘progressivist 
doctrines’. The plural here is important. Bull recognised that there was not necessarily 
any agreement on what that progress was. This said, he does list a number of points 
that he sees as characteristic of idealism, which include democratisation, a more 
international mindset, the creation of the League, a stronger international law and the 
work of ‘men of peace’. The role of international relations, in Bull’s definition of 
idealism, was to assist these changes (1972: 33-6). Although Bull’s definition brings 
together a number of disparate points (and authors, since not all of Bull’s list of points 
were agreed to by all those classed as idealists), the central characteristic of a 
progressive outlook does unite the authors often classed as idealist. Although it should 
be pointed out that it would also unite them with much of Carr’s writing too. In the 
bulk of the rest of the literature idealism becomes a parody, in which its central tenets 
seem to be defined by whatever the author sees realism as not being. In Kenneth 
Thompson’s 1977 survey, for example, idealism becomes (i) the belief that 
institutions can change people’s behaviour; (ii) that idealism distinguishes between 
good and evil; and (iii) that ‘justice is a pre-eminent concern’ (Thompson, 1977: 199-
209). While (i) is true of some writers like Mitrany, (ii) and (iii) are not characteristics 
of the vast majority of the writers of the period, and certainly not of those most often 
classed as idealists like Angell, Zimmern or Woolf. Both John Vasquez and Trevor 
Taylor define idealism (or, in Taylor’s case, utopianism) as having a faith in reason to 
create a peaceful global polity. For Taylor reason leads to a belief in a single moral 
code and a common concept of justice, while Vasquez repeats Carr’s charge of the 
harmony of interests (Taylor, 1985: 92-107; Vasquez, 1983: 13-9). While this faith in 
reason is true for some (Woolf and Angell, for example), it was not true for all 
(Mitrany and Brailsford). For Anne Tickner idealism is described as a ‘legalistic-
moralistic… approach’, which is implicitly linked in her analysis to ‘the misguided 
morality of appeasement’ (Tickner, 1988: 433). As we shall see later in our analysis, 
this supposed link between appeasement and writers written off as idealist is complete 
nonsense. 
 There is also confusion in the modern literature about what happened and 
when. Groom and Olson, who single out Alfred Zimmern as an idealist (1991: 73-4), 
argue that in the 1920s idealism was largely an attribute of non-professional IR 
writers, rather than of the ‘mainstream literature’. Talking of the pre-1931 textbooks 
in IR, Groom and Olson ask the question ‘to what extent was this literature “idealist 
internationalist?” The short answer is “not much”’ (1991: 69). They see, like Carr, a 
major change after 1931, but then make the surprising claim, that certainly does not 
seem true of British IR, that there was a ‘relative dearth of mainstream literature in the 
depression decade’. This seems to suggest that they did not regard Brailsford, Angell, 
Mitrany or Woolf as mainstream thinkers. Others, in contrast to Groom and Olson, 
assume that idealism was the dominant paradigm in IR prior to the 1930’s, and that 
after that it was challenged by realism. Michael Banks talks of realism as a victor in a 
Great Debate with idealism in the 1930s; Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff see the 1930s as 
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characterised by ‘a growing recognition among international relations of the gap 
between the “utopians” and the “realists”, which was best summarised by Carr’; Steve 
Smith states that the ‘response to the failure of idealism to explain the dominant 
events of the 1930s was the emergence, in good Kuhnian fashion, of an alternative 
paradigm, realism’; while James Der Derian sees realism as cast ‘from idealism’s 
failure to stop Hitlerism’ (Banks, 1985: 10; Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, 1990: 6-7; 
Smith, 1987: 192; Der Derian, 1995: 1). In a later publication Steve Smith relocates 
the debate between realism and idealism to the later 1930s and early 1940s (1995: 14), 
which does correspond to the publication of The Twenty Years’ Crisis and its many 
critics, as well as a flurry of more realist texts in the United States. 
 
Were the idealists really idealist? 
What comes out of this summary is a general air of confusion amongst those 
who refer to idealism and utopianism. There is no agreement about what idealism is 
(is it an attribute of realism, a mode of thought along with realism, or a separate 
paradigm?), what it stood for (is it a belief in institutions, or a common morality, or 
justice, or reason, or science?) where it lay on the political spectrum (conservative, 
liberal, socialist, or moralistic pacifist?) or when it existed ( pre-1914, 1920s, 1930s or 
1940s?). Even Carr’s definitions of utopianism are not always consistent. Peter 
Wilson manages to distil three common charges against idealism, largely taken from 
Carr’s definition of utopianism. These are: 
 
1. Utopians ‘pay little attention to facts and analysis of cause and 
effect, devoting their energies instead to the “elaboration of 
visionary projects for the attainment of ends which they have in 
view”...’ 
2. Utopians ‘grossly underestimate the role of power in international 
politics, and overestimate the role, actual and potential, of 
morality, law, public opinion, and other “non-material” 
sanctions…’ 
3. Utopians ‘fail to recognise that their espousal of universal interests 
amount to nothing more than the promotion and defence of a 
particular status quo… utopians fail to appreciate the self-
interested character of their thought’ (Wilson, 2003: 20) 
 
Let us take a look at each of these three charges in turn in relation to five thinkers 
regularly accused of being idealists: Norman Angell, Leonard Woolf, Philip Noel 
Baker, H. N. Brailsford and David Mitrany. 
 The first charge does not seem to have any applicability to these five writers. 
The attention to factual details that is a common attribute of much of their writings 
during this period is a clear refutation of this charge. The inter-war writings of all five 
are often deeply concerned with cause and effect. In the 1920s worries about the 
effect that the peace treaties would have on future relations is an example of this, 
while the common concern amongst these writers about the effects of the British 
National Government’s policies towards the League is another. Despite the common 
normative thread that links writers such as Angell, Woolf, Brailsford, Noel Baker and 
Mitrany, there are precious few ‘visionary projects’ amongst them. In all five cases 
their concerns were with gradual reform, rather than imaginary utopias. There is no 
grand final vision in Angell’s thought. His concern is far more with people’s failure to 
recognise the facts of the changing nature of our new globalised economy (see Angell, 
1911 and 1933). Brailsford does have a vision of a more peaceful world populated 
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with democratic socialist governments, and certainly David Mitrany criticised him for 
his over-optimism on this score (Mitrany, 1945a; Brailsford, 1945; Mitrany 1945b), 
but he did try and back this up with arguments, borrowed from J. A. Hobson, for why 
he thought capitalist states were more war-prone (Brailsford, 1934). Mitrany has a 
vision of a world made up of inter-connected functional organisations, but he presents 
reasons why he thinks that this can, and is, happening, and he also argues why he 
thinks it conforms to the ‘spirit of the age’ (Mitrany, 1933). Woolf, as befits his 
Fabian background, is obsessed with backing up his arguments with facts, and his 
most visionary pronouncements about decolonisation actually became British colonial 
policy from the 1940s onwards (Woolf, 1920). Noel Baker’s concern with making the 
League of Nations work hardly seems visionary. Rather, it was a recognition that the 
League existed, and despite its flaws was the only serious means for establishing an 
alternative to an international system based on war(Noel Baker, 1927). His knowledge 
of the realities of League politics, along with his attention to detail on such questions 
as the Geneva Protocol and British war aims during the Second World War, do not 
seem to make him an idealist in terms of the first charge. 
 The charge of underestimating the question of power all depends on how you 
define power. Certainly, one of the major differences between the pessimism of 
conservatives and the optimism of progressives is the assumption amongst the latter 
that power has a positive social side, in addition to a negative exploitative side. All 
five writers had this progressive view of power. The import of Carr’s charge, 
however, is that the utopian writer is one that wilfully ignores the problem of the 
power relations in the world around them, and assume that other, weaker, forces will 
suffice to cancel out the ‘pole of power’, to use Wolfers’ phrase. This charge could 
certainly be levelled at George Lansbury, the leader of the Parliamentary Labour Party 
from 1931 to 1935, whose strong faith in leading by example convinced him that the 
way to answer the rise of fascism was to disarm as a show of our own peaceful intent. 
For Angell the very existence of irresponsible power, coupled with his low opinion of 
the public mind, made some kind of international authority like the League a 
necessary pre-condition of a more peaceful world (Angell, 1972; Angell, 1935). 
Morality, for Angell, was a transitory thing that was a reflection of legal norms, while 
the law required some form of powerful authority to make it work, and public opinion 
was too easily led by jingoism towards irrationality (Angell, 1926). Brailsford’s 
concerns about power reflected Carr’s. His international thought was influenced by a 
deep mistrust of the powerful capitalist classes, which he saw as having a vested 
interest in the system of modern war (Brailsford in Brinton, 1935). Rather than 
‘grossly underestimating power’, Brailsford was extremely worried about the role 
played by the powerful both domestically and internationally. It was the very 
existence of powerful state interests that led Mitrany to reject federalism as utopian, 
and to present his functional approach as an alternative that was compatible with the 
power relations as they currently existed (Mitrany, 1943). Hans Morgenthau certainly 
seems to have thought that Mitrany’s ideas were realistic, since he endorsed Mitrany’s 
functional approach in 1966 (Morgenthau, 1966). Mitrany’s approach was also 
intensely materialist, basing his arguments on the concept of human needs, and firmly 
rejecting reason as a unifying force (Ashworth, 1999: 38-41 and ch. 4). Noel Baker 
saw the League as essential in a world where, left to their own devises, states would 
revert to power politics. A League with teeth, therefore, was a necessary alternative to 
the violent world of independent states (Noel Baker, 1925). Noel Baker was not 
entirely convinced that the League, as it was currently constructed, was up to the job, 
and regarded a series of reforms as vital if the League was to succeed in creating a 
less violent world (1927: 128-34). Woolf’s analysis of inter-state relations reveals that 
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he certainly did understand the role played by power politics, although he did not see 
it as permanent or even desirable (Wilson, 2004, 73-4). For example, in his 1940 
response to Carr he recognised that the world was going through a time when ‘the use 
of power, force, or violence is playing a predominant part in human society’ (Woolf, 
1940a: 167). 
 The final charge, the failure ‘to appreciate the self-interested character of their 
thought’, is on the face of it more problematic. One part of the charge, however, is 
easily dismissed: that their ideas were used to promote and defend the status quo. All 
were normative thinkers, who were deeply critical of the status quo. In each case their 
ideas were used to promote radical changes to the way that international affairs were 
conducted. In this sense these five writers fit better into the earlier definition of 
idealism and utopianism as progressive, rather than conservative, modes of thought. 
What can be sustained in many cases is the charge of failing to recognise that the 
espousal of universal principles masks the sectional interests behind those principles. 
Certainly, both Angell and Woolf saw concepts like security, peace and justice as 
universal in the modern world. Angell’s work on the optical illusion of war was 
premised on a belief in a common human reason that often seemed far too close to the 
interests of developed western states (Ashworth, 1999: 112-3). Yet, Angell and Woolf 
were certainly not uncritical of their own thought. Angell’s writings after 1918, which 
were never used by Carr in his Twenty Years’ Crisis, take a much more critical line on 
the possibilities of a universal reason (Angell, 1926), while Woolf’s 1940 attack on 
the concept of the harmony of interests gives a good defence of his support for the 
development of rules to govern security at the international level (Woolf, 1940a; 
1940b). In David Mitrany’s case, his use of the concept of human needs, and his 
gravitation to the functional approach as a response to the failings of security policy in 
the inter-war period, was a product of his deep distrust of universal principles such as 
human reason or an abstract justice (Ashworth, 1999: ch. 4). H. N. Brailsford’s ideas 
were rooted in the socialism he shared with Carr, and consequently he was also 
suspicious of claims to universal truth made by what he saw as a capitalist elite. 
Rather, his analysis is rooted in discussions of the question of naked self-interest, 
especially the clash between the interests of capitalists and the rest of the world’s 
population (Brailsford, 1938). For Noel Baker, on the other hand, his faith in the 
League of Nations resided in his mistrust of the idea that some kind of universal 
concept of justice or ethics was enough to bring about a working security system 
(1927: 131). Lorna Lloyd, in her analysis of Noel Baker’s work, does point out, 
though, that he had a strong conviction that progress and the ‘twin power of reason 
and of public opinion’ would eventually lead us to more peaceful alternatives based 
on law (1995: 47-8). So, while this charge is somewhat substantiated, it is not proved 
in any comprehensive way that might lead us to say that these thinkers formed a 
coherent idealist paradigm. Flipping this argument around, it could be said that Carr’s 
views in 1939 were themselves an unconscious defence of the status quo, represented 
by the conservative foreign policy of the so-called National Government of Neville 
Chamberlain. 
 Thus, Carr’s criticisms of utopianism are hard to use against the five writers 
that I have singled out above. The problem with Carr’s analysis is not that his 
methodology was wrong per se, although his immediate grasp of the international 
situation proved horribly wrong, it is more that he was pushing at an open door. His 
vision of a science of IR that combined a realistic grasp of the world as it was, as well 
as a commitment to a sensible and progressive utopianism, already existed in the 
inter-war period. The problem for Carr, and it is a big one, is that they had not agreed 
with his support for Chamberlain’s foreign policy. The people he classes as utopians 
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were opponents, not supporters, of the policy of appeasement. Perhaps the biggest 
failing of The Twenty Years’ Crisis is that it works backwards from a support for 
appeasement. Because of this it also tends to lump the large group of anti-appeasers it 
discusses into one amorphous mass: ‘Again and again he seizes the opportunity to 
trounce the opponents of Mr Chamberlain’s policy as utopians’ (Rowse, 1947: 292). 
This actually detracts from Carr’s sophisticated theoretical point. It also successfully 
poisoned the wells of inter-war IR by presenting a picture of a realist-idealist conflict 
where none existed. By glossing over the differences between many of the people 
classed as utopians, as well as downplaying their similarities with his own thought, 
Carr’s analysis did not present a rounded picture of the debates of the inter-war 
period. But, of course, it was never Carr’s intention to do that. His argument is a 
deliberate overstatement intended to contradict the arguments of his colleagues in the 
nascent subject of International Relations. The failure to see beyond Carr’s polemics 
lies with those later writers who took The Twenty Years Crisis at face value without 
bothering to look any deeper at the book’s context. 
 
Understanding inter-war IR 
 So what were the big splits in English-speaking IR in the inter-war period? 
The first point to make is that the state of the debate was different in Britain than it 
was in the United States, although there was a certain intellectual overlap. The second 
is that the common parody of the inter-war period seems to assume that the same 
issues were relevant throughout. That, in a curiously anachronistic way, the problem 
was always how to deal with Hitler, or someone like him. This is a gross distortion. 
To support pooled or collective security under the League had very different 
connotations in 1920, 1929 and 1938. The context of international relations changed 
so rapidly over the two decades of the inter-war period that the various debates over 
foreign affairs, especially in British circles, tended to shift dramatically. In all, there 
were four distinct phases. The first, from 1918 to 1924, is dominated by the hopes and 
failures of the peace treaties. During this period the major points of discussion within 
IR focused on the shape of the new order; the prospects for, and disappointment with, 
the new League of Nations; and, for many on the left, the possibilities for 
renegotiating the peace treaties to make them less punitive. The period ends with the 
French occupation of the Ruhr and the election of centre-left governments in Britain 
and France.  The second period, between 1924 and 1931, saw a marked drop in calls 
from the left for the revision of the League and the peace treaties, and a growing 
commitment to work within the realities of the League. The major issues were 
German reparations and inter-Allied debts, copper fastening the pooled security 
system by outlawing war, and sorting out the relationship between arbitration, League 
sanctions (including League-approved military intervention) and disarmament. The 
period began with the normalisation of Franco-German relations, and the abortive 
Geneva Protocol, continued with the Kellog-Briand Pact and the Locarno Treaty (seen 
as a weaker form of the Geneva Protocol by many on the left), and ended with an 
abortive disarmament conference, the Japanese invasion of Manchuria and the 
economic crisis sparked by the Wall Street Crash. The third period between 1931 and 
1936 marks the overlap between the period when the League offered a viable 
alternative world order and the confrontation with fascism. The League still remained 
a realistic option around which to organise resistance to fascism, but the reluctance of 
the British and French governments to use the League, the growing independence of 
the British Dominions, and America’s continued semi-isolation led to the League 
being increasingly sidelined in relations between the democracies and the 
dictatorships. The electoral disaster of 1931 hamstrung the British Labour Party, 
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which had been a major supporter of the League system since 1924, and left British 
policy in the hands of a National Government that tended to be suspicious of League 
collective security, and was increasingly committed to a policy of appeasement 
towards Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy. Finally, 1936 to 1939 saw many of the pro-
League commentators on international affairs switch to advocating rearmament and 
collective defence arrangements to isolate Germany. The original opponents of 
League collective security, as well as many pacifists who had been suspicious of the 
League from the beginning, supported policies of peaceful change and the 
appeasement of Germany. The inter-war debates, especially in Britain, cannot be 
understood without first grasping the way that the changing international environment 
altered and informed the debates. 
The major split on the left in the English-speaking world was the debate over 
whether or not capitalism was the cause of war. It reached its zenith in Britain with an 
exchange of articles in the New Statesman and Nation from February to April 1935, 
which, amongst others, pitted Brailsford and Harold Laski against Woolf and Angell. 
The debate was published in book form in the same year. The major difference 
centred on whether, as Brailsford claimed, capitalism created the conditions that made 
war likely, or whether the causes of modern war lay more in intangible problems like 
xenophobic nationalism. In this sense the debate could be called a materialist-idealist 
debate, although at least one side of this debate saw it as pitting socialism against non-
socialists (Brinton, 1935). A second debate within the left centred on the value of the 
League of Nations. The League had started off deeply unpopular with the left in 
Britain, but many had reconciled themselves to making the best of a bad job. Others, 
especially the communists, continued to see the League as a bourgeois institution 
serving imperialist interests. 
In Britain the main split between the left and the right did go part of the way 
towards resembling a realist-idealist debate. The major figures in the Conservative 
Party, many of which would go on to develop the policy of appeasement, wanted a 
return to the pre-1914 diplomatic system, and resented Britain being tied into any kind 
of pooled security system. An exception to this was Robert Cecil, who remained the 
strongest voice for League collective security amongst the Tories, and to a lesser 
extent Anthony Eden. Interestingly, Cecil was retained by the Labour Government in 
1929 as an advisor to the Foreign Secretary. Amongst supporters of League collective 
security the major debate remained the question of League sanctions. Did an 
international body need, or even have the right, to use force against a sovereign state? 
Underlying this was the question of the viability of the concept of sovereignty in the 
modern world, and the role of the nation state in a viable alternative to power politics. 
This debate became less pronounced after 1936 with the failure to sustain League 
sanctions against Italy after the invasion of Abyssinia. It was superseded by the debate 
over the question of how to deal with the dictators, and the issue of rebuilding a more 
limited collective security system to confront Germany and Italy. A major distinction 
has to be drawn between those, like George Lansbury or Stafford Cripps, whose 
positions remained unchanged even as the international context fluctuated wildly, and 
those such as Brailsford, Woolf, Angell, Noel Baker and Mitrany, who altered their 
positions as events unfolded. If there can be said to be a group of idealists or utopians, 
in Carr’s sense, then perhaps it should be used to describe those who failed to modify 
their positions to fit the new realities. What is remarkable about the five writers 
mentioned above was the extent to which they did react to changing realities. 
Brailsford’s switch to supporting the League in 1928, despite his deep reservations 
expressed in 1920, or Woolf’s sidelining of the League in his Labour Party 
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memoranda from 1936 onwards, are good examples of this realistic appreciation of 
the changes occurring around them. 
What is interesting about this split between the conservative supporters of the 
old diplomacy and the liberal and socialist supporters of the new is that between 1924 
and 1936 there was largely a consensus on the importance of the League of Nations. 
The question was more one of how the League should be used. Some writers in IR 
that have looked at the inter-war period have sometimes made the mistake of 
assuming that the conservatives were deeply suspicious of the League, while the 
liberals and all but the extreme socialists supported it in one way or another. This is 
only partially true. In fact the majority of the leadership of the British Conservative 
Party supported the continued use of the League. Where they differed from the major 
liberals and socialists was in how they saw the League being used. For them it was a 
tool for the continuation of the old diplomacy of inter-state balance of power 
(Zilliacus, 1944: 281-2). This should not surprise us considering that it was 
Conservative Politicians who helped to forge the League, as a League of cabinets, in 
the first place. Initially it was the disappointed liberals and socialists who attacked the 
League, and interestingly many liberals and socialists abandoned the League system 
in the 1930s, while many conservative commentators continued to see it as a weak, 
yet functioning, institution within the broader context of power politics. To see 
support of the League as a hallmark of an idealist approach, therefore, is to stretch the 
concept of idealist to include the self-styled realists of the British Conservative Party. 
It would also mean excluding such writers as Angell, Woolf and Brailsford from 
idealism from about 1936 onwards. 
 In all, though, the concept of idealism does not help us understand our subject 
in the least bit. The various disparate and contradictory concepts associated with the 
term idealism do not describe the writers of the inter-war period in any meaningful 
way. Nor does idealism help us understand the varieties of thought that existed at the 
time. The concept of idealism also underpins a Whiggish version of history that 
ignores the complexities and changes that have occurred over the twenty years of the 
inter-war period in order to construct a simplified history that serves modern 
concerns. In fact, there seems to be no reason for keeping the term idealism in the IR 
lexicon at all. It is, to use Hayek’s phrase, a weasel word with so many contradictory 
meanings that its single useful purpose seems to be to obscure rather than to reveal. In 
the case of idealism it acts as a convenient way to write off a whole generation of 
progressive writers. Worryingly, recent progressives seem to have colluded in this 
process. 
 So, having demolished the main tool by which academic IR has understood the 
inter-war period we need a new ordering principle around which to organise our 
thinking. The best replacement for a Whig history, which orders its narrative around 
modern concerns and oversimplifications, is a history that tries to recreate the 
complexities of the past through detailed studies of particular parts of the story. If IR 
scholars are serious about understanding the history of their discipline then misleading 
blanket over-generalisations need to be replaced by a myriad of in-depth studies, each 
illuminating aspects of what is a complex and still largely untold story. 
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